Reference ID: 09ISLAMABAD1438
Created: 2009-06-30 10:10
Released: 2010-11-30 21:09
Classification: SECRET
Origin: Embassy Islamabad
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ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 301045Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3504
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/DISA CENTRAL COMMAND MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0583
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0813
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 5183
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI 1930
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE 7532
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 6480
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 001438
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PHUM EAID PK
SUBJECT: NSA JONES' JUNE 25 MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ZARDARI
Classified By: Anne W. Patterson for reasons 1.4 (b,d)
¶1. (C) Summary: In their June 25 meeting in Islamabad,
National Security Advisor General James Jones and President
Zardari discussed: Pakistan's military offensive against
extremists; GOP capacity to fight terrorism; the nature of
extremism in Pakistan; drones; Iran; Afghanistan; Zardari's
conversation with Indian PM Singh in Russia; and the positive
trend of U. S. Pakistan relations.
End Summary.
¶2. (C) National Security Advisor General James Jones,
Ambassador, and delegation from the National Security Council
met President Zardari and a GOP delegation at the Presidency
on June 25. Pakistan's military campaign in Malakand and
Waziristan had been positively noted in the U.S., said Jones,
which welcomed the display of resolve. The trendline in
relations between the U.S. and Pakistan was positive, said
Jones. Zardari rejoined that the most important component of
the relationship was the goodwill expressed by the USG toward
Pakistan; his own tenure in office (ten months) was short and
his popularity not high, but goodwill from America was
central to his and Pakistan's future.
¶3. (C) Pakistan was united, said Zardari: the people have
the will to support the military in its campaign to stop the
taliban/extremists operating in the country. He cautioned
that the fight against militant extremism would be a long
one, lasting not months but many, many years and that lack of
vigilance on the GOP's part would be devastating. As
confident as he was of the military's resolve -- this time
-- to fight Pakistani militancy, he was equally convinced
that any failure to maintain pressure on the militants after
showing such resolve would have grave consequences.
¶4. (S) President Zardari thanked the U.S. for its assistance
while stating he needed "a battalion of helicopters" to fight
the extremists now, and in the future. He also made repeated
pleas for drones to be "put in Pakistan's hands" so that
Pakistan would own the issue and drone attacks (including
collateral damage) would not provoke anti-americanism.
Zardari said the technology behind them was not cutting-edge
and said he has raised the issue with the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
¶5. (C) Journalist Bob Woodward (traveling with the NSA Jones
delegation) joined the meeting later and asked Zardari why he
had sharpened his attack on the extremists in the last six
months. "Organization," replied Zardari, who noted he had
been in office a short time and had used the first four
months to prepare. Pointing to the death of his
father-in-law Zulfikar Bhutto and assassination of his wife,
Benazir, Zardari said he had been confronting extremism (or
the ideology from which it was birthed) for more than thirty
years. His wife had been targeted for assassination as early
as 1988, when she was viewed as a symbol of feminism and all
that it represented. The Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) of
which he was the head (like the Bhuttos before him) had
always been ousted from power by the military, said Zardari,
which previously had been aligned with fundamentalism.
¶6. (C) Jones asked Zardari how he viewed relations in the
region and told Zardari President Obama's own policy toward
Iran would have to be reexamined given events unfolding
there. Whatever had happened during the election, Iranian
leadership could not pretend nothing had occurred and return
as if there had been no shift.
¶7. (C) Zardari noted that several tri-lateral forums had
been created in the region with the ostensible purpose of
supporting Afghanistan. He counseled that the USG must
"cooperate with Turkey, and Iran," acknowledging at the same
time that the GOP too was perplexed and disappointed by what
had happened in Iran. As to Afghanistan, he said all
countries had to be encouraged -- even if (as in the case of
Russia), only to be urged not to meddle. Zardari accused
India of providing the precursor chemicals necessary to
produce heroine, which he said was funding the taliban in
Afghanistan.
¶8. (C) Asked by NSA Jones, what was the best that could be
hoped for in Afghanistan, Zardari spoke of substituting
hybrid corn for poppies, even if at a subsidized price, to
ISLAMABAD 00001438 002 OF 002
wean farmers from the opium trade. He said China might be
interested or persuaded to invest in the venture. Zardari's
vision was to use that corn for ethanol production; he
welcomed the indication of interest shown by National
Geographic CEO John Fahey, and invited him to return to
Pakistan for a briefing on the concept.
¶9. (C) More broadly, Zardari praised the industriousness of
the Pashtun people. Currently they were "very good warriors,"
but they were also natural entrepreneurs and the hardest
working people of Pakistan. If their entrepreneurial power
could be unleashed, the problems "in the Pashtun belt" would
largely be resolved.
¶10. (C) Over the medium term, Pakistan had to built its
economy so that is could pay its own expenses to combat
extremism, added Zardari, who thought this possible if
exports could be increased three-fold. (He said he would
raise the issue with National Security Council Senior
Director Lipton in his upcoming visit to Pakistan.) He
thanked the USG for all it was doing to aid Pakistan and
asked for more financial assistance.
¶11. (C) Zardari signaled that there had been some progress
in his talks with Indian PM Singh in Russia, even though he
had noted earlier that India's military capacity was ten-fold
Pakistan's. He regretted not being able to meet Singh at the
upcoming Sharm el-Sheikh summit but, he said, "unfortunately,
PM Gilani had already announced he would be going to Sharm"
(sic). In his meeting with Singh, said Zardari, he had
underscored that "there could not be a better political
moment" to improve relations across the board. India was a
mature democracy and an ancient nation, said Zardari. "Singh
is an excellent economist," he said, but Zardari was not
convinced the Indian Prime Minister understood the
constraints under which Zardari was operating. Helping Singh
to understand them was of import, hinted Zardari. NSC Senior
Director Don Camp said the Indian perspective was to question
GOP activism and to ask what it had done to quash terrorist
organizations. NSA Jones reminded Zardari how important it
was to ensure there was not another Mumbai-style attack.
Zardari reiterated that Singh was unaware of what it took to
"change the mind-set of Pakistan's "establishment," given
Pakistan's short history of fragile democratic regimes
toppled by the military.
¶12. (U) NSA Jones has cleared this cable.
PATTERSON
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