London: Disgraced Pakistani nuclear scientist A Q Khan clandestinely provided Iran with centrifuges, technical designs, components and an 'address book' of suppliers which helped Tehran to make significant advances in its secret nuclear programme, a leading London-based Think-Tank revealed on Wednesday.
"Khan probably had some signal, if not explicit permission, from his superiors for nuclear cooperation with Iran," the International Institute for Strategic Studies said in its Strategic dossier Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A Q Khan and the rise of proliferation networks released on Wednesday.
However, "no evidence has yet emerged that a clear directive was ever given to Khan to provide nuclear technology to Iran," the 176-page dossier stated.
Answering questions, Mark Fitzpatrick, Editor of the new publication, told newsmen that Khan would have earned $100 million through his clandestine sale of nuclear technology but could not say where the money had gone after his house arrest.
"Khan provided Iran with centrifuges, technical designs, components and an 'address book' of suppliers. Some details concerning exactly what Iran received are still uncertain. What is clear is that Khan's sales helped Iran to make significant advances in its clandestine nuclear programme," it said.
The dossier said in a written confession in 2004, Khan admitted to supplying North Korea with about two dozen centrifuge machines together with sets of drawings, sketches, technical data and depleted uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas.
"These items were probably transported to North Korea in unmarked containers on chartered Pakistani air force flights," the dossier said. This small number of centrifuges would have been insufficient to produce enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear bomb. Along with the centrifuge designs Khan gave North Korea a template on which to base their own centrifuge production plans.
"As with the Iranians, Khan also reportedly provided a 'shopping list' to the North Koreans, which enabled Pyongyang to purchase additional components directly from other foreign suppliers. The transfers precipitated the breakdown of the US-North Korea Agreed Framework and Pyongyang's resumption of its plutonium programme, with as yet unknown ripple effects," the dossier said.
Fitzpatrick said from the outset, Pakistan government gave Khan a remarkable degree of authority and autonomy, partly because of the highly sensitive nature of his work, and partly because he was able to achieve tangible results.
"Concerns about foreign intelligence operations targeting Pakistan's nuclear programme, and the increased secrecy and compartmentalisation that resulted, allowed Khan to operate more independently. An unhealthy rivalry with other Pakistani nuclear organisations contributed to even greater secrecy and shady business practices. Unquestioned, Khan began to order many more components than Pakistan's own enrichment programme required," the dossier said.
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