Ehsanullah Ehsan, a former spokesman of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), has accused the Pakistani Army and, in particular, its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of providing special hospitality to scores of high-profile leaders of the Islamic State of Khorasan extremist group, also called Daesh. This allegation made in an article written by Ehsan comes in the backdrop of Pakistani government’s widespread crackdown to deport hundreds of thousands of Afghan refugees from its territory to coerce the Afghan Taliban government in Kabul into taking action against TTP. The latter has emerged as a formidable threat to Pakistan’s internal security.
Even if Ehsan’s allegations are kept aside on account of originating from a spokesperson of an extremist group, there are serious questions about the Pakistani establishment’s historical reliance on non-state actors to further its foreign policy goals. It has shaped the country’s geopolitical landscape and ensured the Army maintains an upper hand in deciding the regional policy of the country and by extension provides it a means of control over the state institutions. While many argue that Islamabad’s adoption of this policy dates to Soviet occupation of Afghanistan starting in 1979, its roots, in essence, extend back to Pakistan’s emergence from British India in 1947.
The country’s use of non-state actors was intricately linked to its quest for asymmetric methods to counter its larger adversary, India, during its formative years as an independent state. For instance, within three months of its establishment, Pakistan mobilised thousands of tribal militiamen who launched an invasion of Jammu and Kashmir on 22 October 1947. This action was in gross violation of its standstill agreement with Maharaja Hari Singh, the then ruler of the princely state, who was keen on joining India. This explicit use of non-state actors aimed to fulfil the foreign policy objective of annexing Kashmir and change the facts on the ground amidst the redrawing of the Indian subcontinent. Despite the setback of failure in 1948 to accomplish this objective, Pakistan pursued Operation Gibraltar, discreetly inserting hundreds of its military personnel disguised as militants into Kashmir, aiming to foment what could be construed as an internal insurgency against India. This trend of proxy utilisation persisted over time, gaining momentum particularly in the late 1980s when Pakistan redirected hundreds of fighters who had returned from Afghanistan into Kashmir, resulting in numerous civilian casualties.
The strategic use of proxy actors gained prominence during the Afghan-Soviet War in the 1980s, a period deeply entrenched within the broader Cold War dynamics between the US-led capitalist bloc and the Soviet-led Communist bloc. In this war, Pakistan, under General Zia-ul-Haq who Islamised state institutions, assumed a frontline role in organising and training anti-Soviet Mujahideen forces through its powerful Army. The success of the Afghan campaign brought first dividends to Pakistan and is the reason being considered as the inception of Islamabad’s strategic alliance with non-state actors to achieve regional goals.
Non-state actors in essence offer unique advantages to their state sponsors, with their independence from official government structures allowing plausible deniability, enabling the pursuit of objectives without direct attribution or accountability. For Pakistan, these proxy groups served as a potent lever to disrupt regional stability and exert pressure on neighbouring countries, notably Afghanistan, a tactic that endured until the downfall of the Afghan Taliban, supported by Islamabad in August 2021.
With Afghan Taliban back in power in Afghanistan, Pakistan appears to have successfully courted the Islamic State Khorasan leadership as a counterweight to Kabul to exert pressure as and when required. This can be demonstrated by gradual decline of the terror acts committed by the Daesh in Pakistan and a surge in their violence inside Afghanistan since the last few years. Interestingly, most of the attacks have been attributed to TTP and Baloch nationalists, with Islamabad accusing the Afghan Taliban of extending their patronage to these groups. This is a classic case of blowback that Pakistan has suffered with its own patronised group turning against it, symbolising the double-edged sword nature of these relations.
Therefore, the allegations that the hospitality extended to Daesh extremists across Pakistan by the ISI and Army does not come as a surprise. With the return of the Afghan Taliban to power in Afghanistan, it seems Islamabad has strategically and successfully courted the leadership of the Islamic State Khorasan, possibly to exert pressure on Kabul when deemed necessary like the current standoff between the Pakistani government and Afghan Taliban.
Notably, there are reports circulating about a covert Dobari Agreement between the Pakistani Army and Daesh, in which the extremist group has purportedly committed to scaling down its violence within Pakistan’s borders. More importantly, this agreement outlines an exemption for military entities as Daesh targets within Pakistan, shedding light on why the few attacks that have been attributed to this have predominantly focused on the sectarian targets.
This shift becomes evident through the gradual decrease in Daesh-led terror activities within Pakistan, juxtaposed against a noticeable surge in their violent actions inside Afghanistan over recent years. This assumes significance in the light of international media reporting a gradual increase in the presence of Islamic State Khorasan militants in Pakistan’s tribal regions. However, what is noteworthy is that despite this, an overwhelming 90 percent of the 300 attacks recorded in the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province in 2023 have been attributed to the TTP, prompting Islamabad to accuse the Afghan Taliban of extending an umbrella of support to these groups.
Furthermore, the bulk of military actions have been directed towards the TTP and Baloch nationalist groups. This narrative aligns with the speculation that Pakistan might be nurturing ISKP leaders as a strategic counterbalance to the Afghan Taliban, potentially leveraging them as a means to coerce Kabul into adhering to Islamabad’s directives while curbing the influence of groups like TTP.
In the light of these allegations and assertions, it is not surprising that Pakistan continues to rely on its much-tested policy of using non-state actors to achieve its regional objectives. However, this has come at the cost of regional instability whose ramifications have also been a blowback to Pakistan itself through various groups turning rogue and creating internal insecurity. While this should have served as a lesson for the Pakistani policymakers, yet unfortunately, it appears they refuse to learn from their historical blunders.
The writer is an author and columnist and has written several books. He tweets @ArunAnandLive. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely that of the author. They do not necessarily reflect News18’s views.
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